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NON-DESCRIPTIVISM ABOUT MODALITY
A Brief History and Revival
ABSTRACT: Despite the otherwise-dominant trends towards phys-
icalism and naturalism in philosophy, it has become increasingly
common for metaphysicians to accept the existence either of modal
facts and properties, or of Lewisian possible worlds. This paper
raises the historical question: why did these heavyweight realist
views come into prominence? The answer is that they have arisen
in response to the demand to find truthmakers for our modal state-
ments. But this demand presupposes that modal statements are
descriptive claims in need of truthmakers. This presupposition
was, however, rejected by many earlier analytic philosophers, in-
cluding the logical positivists, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Sellars, all of
whom denied that (at least certain kinds of) modal statement were
descriptive at all. Yet the non-descriptivist approach has largely
fallen out of discussion and out of philosophical consciousness. In
this paper I examine why non-descriptivist views first came into
and then fell out of favor, and consider what the prospects are for
reviving this more deflationary approach to modality.
INTRODUCTION
You may find yourself living with modal realism. You may find yourself
with a lot of possible worlds. You may ask yourself, how did I get here?
It has become increasingly common for metaphysicians to accept the
existence either of other possible worlds or of modal properties in this
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world. The pressure to do so comes from the perceived need to find
truthmakers for modal propositions; in fact, it is widely assumed that
“the problem of modality is a problem about truthmakers for modal
propositions” (Roy 2000, 56). The obvious truthmakers to posit are
modal facts or properties. The Lewisian reductive alternative enables
us to avoid positing modal facts or properties, but only at the cost of
accepting a multitude of possible worlds causally and spatio-temporally
isolated from our world.1
But both of these views sit uncomfortably with the otherwise dom-
inant trends in metaphysics towards naturalism and physicalism. For
neither modal properties and facts nor Lewisian possible worlds are
easy to reconcile with a naturalistic ontology. And prospects are even
worse for providing any plausible epistemological story of how we could
come to acquire knowledge of such non-empirical modal features of the
actual world, or of (non-modal) features of causally isolated possible
worlds.
The point of this paper, however, is not to criticize these views, but
rather to raise a historical question: How did we get here? How did
views like these come to be so dominant, despite their tension with the
otherwise prevalent physicalist and naturalist trends in metaphysics?2 If
we think of the problem of modality as the problem of finding truthmak-
ers for modal propositions, then it is, to say the least, a very tough nut
to crack. But if we examine the history of treatments of modality over
the past century, it becomes clear that this is not the only and so not an
inevitable way of viewing the problem of modality.
In the early days of analytic philosophy, a more deflationary ap-
proach to modality held sway: one that denied that modal statements
are descriptive at all. The approach was suggested by early convention-
alists like Schlick3 (1918), and developed in a new way by Wittgenstein
in the Tractatus, which in turn influenced the later modal convention-
alism of the logical positivists. The approach reappeared in a more
sophisticated version in the work of the later Wittgenstein, and then
resurfaced in the work of Ryle (1950/1971) and Sellars (1958). But
despite this august list of defenders, the view has largely been aban-
doned and forgotten.4
This paper is an exercise in philosophical archeology. I will first trace
the roots of this alternative approach to modality, examining why it was
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originally found attractive and why it later fell out of favor. I will go on
to argue that its rejection was unwarranted. I will ultimately suggest
that the currently dominant approaches to modality are the product of
a historical wrong turn, and that by looking back to these earlier stages
of history we might hope to find the basis for a better understanding of
modality.
1. EARLY NON-DESCRIPTIVISM
Analytic philosophy generally traces its roots back to British empiricism,
and more immediately to the empiricism of the logical positivists. The
challenges of giving an acceptable account of modality were amply rec-
ognized by thinkers in both traditions. For modal features of the world
do not seem to be empirically detectable. As Hume argued, we cannot
be thought to know necessary matters of fact (or rather: to know that
any matter of fact holds necessarily) on the basis of experience—for
however well a statement may be confirmed through experience, that
only shows that it does (so far) hold, not that it must hold (cf. Ayer
1936/1952, 72).
In the face of this, one might retreat to holding that the laws of the
natural sciences are only statements of highly well-confirmed proposi-
tions—not of any that are necessary. But this seems less acceptable for
the apparently necessary truths of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics.
Thus Ayer summarizes the options for the empiricist as follows:
. . . if empiricism is correct no proposition which has a fac-
tual content can be necessary or certain. Accordingly the
empiricist must deal with the truths of logic and mathe-
matics in one of the two following ways: he must say ei-
ther that they are not necessary truths, in which case he
must account for the universal conviction that they are; or
he must say that they have no factual content, and then
he must explain how a proposition which is empty of all
factual content can be true and useful and surprising. . .
if we can show either that the truths in question are not
necessary or that they are not ‘truths about the world’, we
shall be taking away the support on which rationalism rests.
We shall be making good the empiricist contention that
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there are no ‘truths of reason’ which refer to matters of fact.
(1936/1952, 72-3)
Mill took the first route, treating even the axioms of logic and math-
ematics as merely well-confirmed observational hypotheses—empirical
generalizations, not necessary truths (cf. Baker 1988, 173).5 But Ayer
rejects this first route, denying that the validity of the statements of
logic and mathematics is determined in the same way as that of empir-
ical generalizations. His reason for this is that we don’t take purported
counterexamples to these statements to provide evidence, for example,
that two plus two really is not four, or that the angles of a Euclidean
triangle really don’t add up to 180 degrees. As Ayer puts the matter,
“Whatever instance we care to take, we shall always find that the sit-
uations in which a logical or mathematical principle might appear to
be confuted are accounted for in such a way as to leave the princi-
ple unassailed” (Ayer 1936/1952, 77). Thus, since principles of logic
and mathematics cannot be confuted by experience, this should give us
pause in maintaining that experience is the source of their justification.
The second option for the empiricist is to deny that the necessary
truths of logic or mathematics are factual claims at all; in effect, to deny
that they aim to describe features of the world and instead view them as
non-descriptive statements. The basic statement of the positivist view of
necessity, and often the only one passed down to us, is that “the truths
of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies” (Ayer
1936/1952, 77)—statements which thus say nothing about the world.
This sort of non-descriptivism arose with Schlick’s (1918) thesis (devel-
oped by generalizing Hilbert’s approach to geometry) that the necessary
statements of mathematics and logic are not descriptive statements say-
ing something about the world precisely because they say nothing at all.
On Schlick’s view, necessary truths are simply the result of implicit defi-
nitions of concepts. Since definitions are conventional, they then might
also be said to be ‘conventions of symbolism’, which themselves say
nothing about the world (Baker 1988, 199), even though they enable
us to use these symbols to say things about the world.6
Two central problems arose for Schlick’s initial formulation of con-
ventionalism (Baker 1988, 215). First, it seems to involve treating the
truths of logic as based on arbitrary conventions, when they seem not
to be arbitrary. Second, it faces a regress problem most famously raised
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by Quine in “Truth by Convention” (1935/1976) (where it is put for-
ward primarily as a problem for Carnap’s conventionalism about logical
truth). As Quine argues, if we think of logical truths as including those
expressed in basic axioms (taken as implicit definitions) and any truths
that follow from those, we apparently need logic “for inferring logic from
the conventions” (1935/1976, 104), and so cannot take conventional-
ism to provide a complete account of logical truth.
Although Schlick introduced the approach, the idea that the nec-
essary propositions—at least of logic and mathematics—say nothing,
and thus cannot be thought of as descriptions at all—was popularized
by Wittgenstein’s work in the Tractatus, which even later positivists
routinely acknowledged as the greatest influence on their view (Baker
1988, 208). Rather than thinking of logical and mathematical proposi-
tions as implicit definitions (or following from these), Wittgenstein held
that they are one and all empty tautologies:
6.1 The propositions of logic are tautologies
6.11 The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. (They
are the analytical propositions.) (1922/1933, 155; cf. Hacker
1996, 32)
Tautologies thus understood do not describe anything (not even rela-
tions among logical objects)—they combine meaningful signs in such a
way that all content ‘cancels out’ (Baker 1988, 214). They say nothing
either about the world or about language or logical ‘objects’ themselves.
The Tractarian formulation enables us to avoid both of the problems
faced by Schlick’s view: First, it needn’t involve treating logical truths
as arbitrary. Instead, these truths (the tautologies) are true given only
their logical structure (rather than their status as implicit stipulations or
definitions). Second, we avoid the regress problem: On Wittgenstein’s
view, all logical truths are equally tautologies, as can be shown from
truth-table notation, and so we avoid the need to presuppose logic in
order to infer derivative logical truths from the definitional axioms (cf.
Baker 1988, 215). So, while these critical remarks have been influential
in keeping any views resembling conventionalism at bay, they do not
apply to views like the Tractarian or later Wittgensteinian one.7
But although the propositions of logic do not say anything, accord-
ing to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, their importance lies in what
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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they show—or, more precisely, in what is shown by the fact that the
propositions of logic are tautologies:
6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies
shows the formal—logical—properties of language, of the
world.
That its constituent parts connected together in this way
give a tautology characterizes the logic of its constituent
parts.
For example, if two propositions “p” and “q” form a tautology when they
are combined as “p→q”, that shows (but does not say) that q follows
from p. (6.1221). Moreover “Every tautology itself shows that it is a
tautology” (6.127). Thus in the Tractatus we can see not only the idea
that logical propositions are not descriptions, but also that they serve
some other function—showing, rather than saying.
Much influenced by the (1922/1933) Tractatus, (see Hacker 1996,
46) the positivists adopted the idea that the necessary propositions of
logic and mathematics are tautologies or analytic claims, marrying it
with the following understanding of analyticity: “. . . a proposition is
analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the sym-
bols it contains”, (Ayer 1936/1952, 78). The positivists’ view is often
summarized as the view that necessary/analytic propositions are those
whose truth depends on our linguistic conventions (which define the
terms used), and labeled as a form of ‘modal conventionalism’.
But how should we understand the idea that the truth of neces-
sary/analytic propositions ‘depends on our linguistic conventions’? If
one approaches the problem of modality with what I will call the ‘truth-
maker assumption’, that is, the assumption that the problem of modality
is the problem of accounting for what it is that makes modal claims true,
then it is natural to read the positivists as providing the answer that lin-
guistic conventions serve as the truthmakers for modal statements. This
also provides a straightforward way of understanding the idea that the
truth of these propositions ‘depends on our linguistic conventions’, and
indeed a way of understanding it that is consistent with empiricism.
Some positivists wrote in ways that invite this (mis)interpretation, e.g.
Carnap treats a sentence as L-true (necessarily/analytically true) ‘if and
only if it is true in virtue of the semantical rules alone, independently
of any extra-linguistic facts’ (1947, 174).
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Understanding the view in this way, however, is catastrophic. This
interpretation of conventionalism provoked a barrage of criticism that
led to decades of neglect of similar approaches to modality, and even
to the dominance of heavyweight realist views of modality as reactions
against the apparent failings of conventionalism. Indeed modal con-
ventionalism is still regularly invoked and summarily dismissed on the
basis of pat objections that arise when we understand modal conven-
tionalism on this model (e.g. Boghossian 1997, Sider 2003).8 As Ted
Sider puts it “The old ‘linguistic’ or ‘conventionalist’ theory of necessity
has few contemporary adherents, for the most part with good reason”
(2003, 199). As a result even those who now defend versions of non-
descriptivism tend to avoid association with, or even much discussion
of, their conventionalist forebears.
A first objection (Boghossian 1997, 336, Sider 2003, 199-200) is
that conventionalism makes “the truth of what is expressed [by an an-
alytic claim] contingent, whereas most of the statements at stake in the
present discussion [logical, mathematical and conceptual truths] are
clearly necessary” (Boghossian 1997, 336). For if analytic statements
were “actually about language use” (Sider 2003, 199)—if, e.g. “All
bachelors are men” meant “It is a linguistic convention that ‘bachelor’
is to be applied only where ‘man’ is applied”—then it would clearly be
contingent, since we might have adopted other linguistic conventions
to govern these symbols. This not only seems wrong (it certainly seems
necessary that all bachelors are men), but also would block the attempt
to explain necessity in terms of analyticity, and analyticity in terms of
linguistic conventions.
The second, related, criticism is that the very idea of truth by con-
vention is untenable, since it (allegedly) requires that we can make cer-
tain statements (the analytic or basic modal ones) true ‘by pronounce-
ment’, but (as Boghossian puts it) “how can we make sense of the idea
that something is made true by our meaning something by a sentence?”
(1997, 336). Sider develops the argument further as follows:
I cannot make it the case that it rains simply by pronounc-
ing, nor can I make it the case that it does not rain simply by
pronouncing. . . Therefore, I cannot make it the case that
either it rains or it doesn’t rain, simply by pronouncement.
(2003, 201).
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But while these are the most influential and frequently cited rea-
sons for dismissing modal conventionalism, they completely miss the
point of the original view. To take all those who are labeled as ‘con-
ventionalists’ to be defending the view that the necessary truths of logic
and mathematics are descriptive claims made true by our adopting cer-
tain linguistic conventions is not only uncharitable, but ignores the re-
ally interesting and promising features of their proposal—and of the
Wittgensteinian view that inspired it: namely, that the propositions of
mathematics and logic should not be thought of as descriptive claims in
need of truthmakers at all.9
Ayer, for example, is much more careful than the critics of conven-
tionalism would have us believe, in not suggesting that necessary truths
are descriptions made true by the adoption of linguistic conventions; in-
stead they are ‘entirely devoid of factual content’, and thus describe
neither the (language-independent) world, nor our linguistic conven-
tions. He suggests that analytic statements serve some other function
than describing—they ‘illustrate the rules which govern our usage’ of
the terms or logical particles (1936/1952, 80), ‘record our determina-
tion’ to speak in certain ways, ‘[call] attention to the implications of a
certain linguistic usage’, or ‘indicate the convention which governs our
usage of the words’ (1936/1952, 79. Italics in each case are mine).
Note in all this talk of what analytic statements do—they illustrate, call
attention to, or indicate our rules, usages, or linguistic conventions. . . —
there is no talk of them describing these things (or anything else). And
this careful choice of words is not accidental—for Ayer well understood
that the crucial insight of Wittgenstein’s view (and the crucial insight
needed to make the view workable) was denying that necessary propo-
sitions are descriptive at all (cf. Ayer 1985, 60-67).
Not only does Ayer avoid the mistake of taking analytic statements
to be about our linguistic conventions (they are, as he often—following
Wittgenstein—insists, about nothing), he also shows awareness of the
problems that would arise with that view, responding directly to the
first objection as follows:
. . . just as the validity of an analytic proposition is indepen-
dent of the nature of the external world, so is it indepen-
dent of the nature of our minds. It is perfectly conceivable
that we should have employed different linguistic conven-
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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tions from those which we actually do employ. But what-
ever these conventions might be, the tautologies in which
we recorded them would always be necessary. (1936/1952,
84).
In short it seems unjust and erroneous to have rejected views like
Ayer’s and the early Wittgenstein’s for the reasons customarily given
for dismissing ‘modal conventionalism’.10 Early non-descriptivism, it
seems, was prematurely abandoned.
2. LATER NON-DESCRIPTIVISM AND THE NORMATIVE FUNCTION OF
MODAL DISCOURSE
As I have drawn the story out so far, the crucial insight behind Wittgen-
stein’s view in the Tractatus, which was also picked up in at least the
better formulations of positivism’s conventionalism, is that claims of ne-
cessity are not to be taken as describing the world (or language) at all.
Despite the many changes in Wittgenstein’s views over time, a crucial
point that remains constant is the idea that necessary truths should not
be understood as descriptions, but rather as tautologies which say noth-
ing.11 (But importantly, Wittgenstein’s understanding of what a tautol-
ogy is evolves, so that in the later work a tautology is considered to be
any proposition that can be ascertained to be true exclusively by appeal
to rules of grammar (Baker 1988, 39).)
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is mainly concerned to emphasize the
fact that the necessary truths of logic (which he then held to be the
only necessary truths) lack descriptive content. He retains this view in
his later work, insisting that the propositions of logic do not fulfill a
descriptive function: The universality of a claim like ‘p v ~p’ is not like
that of ‘all apples are sweet’; it’s not describing something that holds
of all propositions (1932-35/1979, 139-40). But in his later work he
also broadens his focus to include analytic statements more generally,
along with some claims of metaphysical necessity, and raises the cru-
cial question: if these propositions do not serve to describe the world,
what is their function? Thus, e.g., Wittgenstein asks: “Why, if they are
tautologies, do we ever write them down? What is their use?” (1932-
35/1979, 137). Clearly we don’t inform by means of them (if, e.g., you
ask me how many people will be present, and I tell you that ‘if there
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are fifteen, there will be fifteen’, I have told you nothing, given you no
information (Wittgenstein 1939/1976, 280)). But we still need a posi-
tive view of what the function or use of these forms of language is, if it
is not descriptive.
The answer Wittgenstein suggests is that (reputed) necessary propo-
sitions fulfill a normative or prescriptive function; much the same as
rules do. While this is the general insight, the precise relation to rules
must be specified carefully, and may vary for different kinds of (reput-
edly) necessary claim. Arithmetical equations are understood as rules
for transforming empirical propositions (about quantities) (which of
course is not to say that they give us predictions about what the results
will be if anyone calculates):
. . . the rules which govern the calculation are such that only
such and such an outcome is correct; anyone who comes up
with a different answer is bound to have made a mistake.
(Ayer 1985, 63)
Propositions of logic are said to ‘reflect’ rules for reasoning in the sense
that ‘P ergo Q’ is a rule of inference if and only if ‘P→Q’ is a tautology
(Baker 1988, 135)—though the tautology itself states nothing (not even
a rule of reasoning or ‘grammatical rule’).
As Hacker describes Wittgenstein’s later view:
Analytic propositions such as ‘Bachelors are unmarried’. . .
are, despite the fact that we talk of them as being true,
rules in the misleading guise of statements (as, indeed, we
say that it is true that the chess king moves only one square
at a time). ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is the expression of a
rule which licenses the inference from ‘A is a bachelor’ to ‘A
is unmarried’. (1996, 49)
What then of purported metaphysical necessities? The later Wittgen-
stein:
. . . rejected the common assumption that what are conceived
of as metaphysical truths are descriptions of anything, that
the ‘necessary truths’ of metaphysics are descriptions of ob-
jective necessities in nature—that the ‘truths’ of metaphysics
are truths about objects in reality at all. Rather, what we
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
11 Amie L. Thomasson
conceive of as true metaphysical propositions are norms
of representation, rules for the use of expressions in the
misleading guise of descriptions of objects and relations
(Hacker 1996, 102).
Thus even the reputed necessary truths of metaphysics are said to ‘dis-
guise’ or ‘hide’ grammatical rules:
. . . when we meet the word ‘can’ in a metaphysical propo-
sition, [e.g. ‘A and B can’t have seen the same chair, for A
was in London and B in Cambridge; they saw two chairs
exactly alike’]. . . [w]e show that this proposition hides a
grammatical rule. That is to say, we destroy the outward
similarity between a metaphysical proposition and an ex-
periential one, and we try to find the form of expression
which fulfils a certain craving of the metaphysician which
our ordinary language does not fulfill and which, as long
as it isn’t fulfilled, produces the metaphysical puzzlement.
(Wittgenstein 1958, 55)12
The idea that modal statements serve an implicitly normative (rather
than descriptive) function surfaces again in the work of Ryle and Sell-
ars, though they expand the issue further, discussing modal expressions
as they appear in hypothetical statements (if P, then Q; or, more perspic-
uously, If P were the case, so would Q be) and in statements of scientific
laws. On Ryle’s view, hypotheticals of the form ‘If P, then Q’ should not
be thought of as asserting (truth-conditional) relations between state-
ments, propositions, or facts. Instead, delivering a hypothetical state-
ment is a way of “giving or taking instruction in [the] technique or
operation” of wielding and following arguments. Saying ‘If P, then Q’ is
not making an assertion, but licensing one:
. . . the author of a hypothetical statement is neither using
nor mentioning any premiss statements or conclusion state-
ments. He is showing, empty-handed, how to use them.
(Ryle 1950/1971, 248)
i.e. such an author is licensing the move from having P, to inferring
Q. Ryle develops a parallel understanding of statements of scientific
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laws in The Concept of Mind, insisting again that these are not factual
statements describing any features of the world, but instead fulfill a
different function:
A law is used as, so to speak, an inference-ticket (a season
ticket) which licenses its possessors to move from asserting
factual statements to asserting other factual statements. It
also licenses them to provide explanations of given facts
and to bring about desired states of affairs by manipulating
what is found existing or happening. (1949, 121)
Sellars (1958) develops a similar treatment of statements of scien-
tific laws, which he treats as having the function of justifying or endors-
ing inferences from something’s being an A to its being a B (cf. Brandom
2008, Chapter 4). To say “‘Being A physically entails being B’. . . contex-
tually implies [without asserting] that the speaker feels himself entitled
to infer that something is B, given that it is A” (Sellars 1958, 281). To
make first-hand use of modal expressions is to be involved in explain-
ing a state of affairs or justifying an assertion. “The primary use of ‘p
entails q’ is not to state that something is the case, but to explain why
q, or to justify the assertion that q” (Sellars, 283). Like other modal
non-descriptivists, Sellars also shows awareness of the potential pitfalls
of modal conventionalism:
It is sometimes thought that modal statements do not de-
scribe states of affairs in the world, because they are really
metalinguistic. This won’t do at all if it is meant that instead
of describing states of affairs in the world, they describe lin-
guistic habits. It is more plausible if it is meant that state-
ments involving modal terms have the force of prescriptive
statements about the use of certain expressions in the object
language. (1958, 283)
This, again, is the key move that unites the later Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment of logical, mathematical, and metaphysical necessities, Ryle’s han-
dling of hypotheticals, and Sellars’ treatment of physical necessities.
Robert Brandom provides the most important contemporary version
of this approach, developing precisely the Sellarsian idea that modal
vocabulary is a ‘transposed’ language of norms (2008, 116). Following
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Sellars and Kant, he argues that the ability to use ordinary empirical
descriptive terms presupposes grasp of the kinds of properties and re-
lations made explicit in our modal vocabulary (2008, 96-7), and that
the primary role of alethic modal vocabulary is not to describe modal
facts or properties, but rather to make explicit “semantic or conceptual
connections and commitments that are already implicit in the use of
ordinary (apparently) non-modal empirical vocabulary” (2008, 99).
That brings us roughly up to date in the brief history of modal non-
descriptivism over the past century. The real mystery the story leaves
behind is this: These are views by some of the major philosophers of the
twentieth century about one of the central problems for analytic philos-
ophy (and one of the most crucial problems for any philosophy with a
vaguely empiricist, scientific, or naturalist bent)—so why are they not
better known? Of course the views mentioned above differ in various
important respects, and to properly evaluate the prospects for a non-
descriptivist understanding of modal discourse we would have to do far
more to develop the view than has been done above. Nonetheless, all
of the views canvassed above have in common the crucial feature that
they deny that modal discourse should be taken as descriptive at all—
whether of other possible worlds, modal features of the actual world, or
platonic essences. So why were views like these abandoned, to the ex-
tent that they are not even on the table in contemporary discussions of
modality—where, as I mentioned at the outset, the question is usually
posed as that of finding the truth-makers for our modal claims, simply
presupposing that these claims are to be understood descriptively?
3. WHY WAS NON-DESCRIPTIVISM ABANDONED?
I must confess I find this mysterious myself, so what follows is at least
partly speculative. As I have argued above, one reason seems to have
been simple failure to understand the position. Wittgenstein’s earlier
Tractarian view was typically (if wrongly) assimilated to the conven-
tionalism of the logical positivists, which (as mentioned above) in turn
was widely believed to have been deeply problematic. But as I have ar-
gued above, it is easy to see that it is unfair to reject all forms of modal
non-descriptivism by association with the problematic forms of conven-
tionalism that held necessary truths to be made true by our adopting
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certain conventions. To the extent that non-descriptivist views were re-
jected for these reasons, the rejection clearly rested (or rests) on a sim-
ple failure to understand the position—a mistake bred in the tendency
to cleave to the truthmaker assumption.
One reason that Wittgenstein’s later views have had little influence
may be historical, owing to the scattered and late-breaking nature of
his remarks on modality. (And even once they appeared, Wittgenstein’s
later views were often dismissed by faulty association with convention-
alism.13) Wittgenstein’s mature view is not made explicit except in scat-
tered passages of his later works (which, however insightful they may
be, can hardly be said to be developed into a full-blown theory of modal
discourse ready to be weighed up against competitors). And many of
the later works in which the relevant remarks appeared were not pub-
lished until after (some long after) his death,14 by which point there
had already been a great sea of change in philosophy from interest in
ordinary language approaches to the dominance of a scientistic Quinean
approach (I will return to discuss this in Section 5).
Still another reason for the lack of influence of the later Wittgen-
stein’s approach may lie in his cryptic and cantankerous style, which
alienated him from many analytic philosophers. Indeed there has been
a huge backlash against Wittgenstein at least partly brought about by
both his style and his embrace of conclusions many philosophers found
repulsive, e.g. that modal claims could not be true, that metaphysi-
cians were simply led astray in talking of modal facts or properties, and
(worst of all) that metaphysics in particular, but also philosophy more
generally, was largely misleading nonsense, in need only of therapy.
It is less clear why Ryle’s (1950/1971) and Sellars’ (1958) papers
are so little known.15 But given their focus on counterfactuals and claims
of scientific necessity/probability, their relevance to the problems of
necessary truths in mathematics, logic, and metaphysics may not have
been immediately evident. At any rate, though parts have long been
suggested, it is fair to say that a full-blown theory of modal discourse
along these lines has simply not been fully developed—at least until
very recently (in Brandom’s work (2008)).
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4. SKETCH OF A CONTEMPORARY NON-DESCRIPTIVIST VIEW
As I have traced the story thus far, the more substantive (and less mis-
guided) reasons later versions of non-descriptivism were ignored come
from the unavailability of a clear and fully developed theory, and from
the association of Wittgenstein’s approach with distasteful theses, such
as claims that modal statements could not be true and that metaphysi-
cians were simply led astray in talking of modal facts or properties.
With that in mind, to better consider the prospects of a view along these
lines, it may be useful to pause from the historical story to sketch how
a contemporary non-descriptivist view might go, and to argue that such
a view can be divorced from some of Wittgenstein’s more contentious
claims.
The key feature of the later Wittgenstein’s view is holding that nec-
essary propositions do not fulfill a descriptive function, but rather serve
a prescriptive or normative function, closely related to that of rules. I
have attempted to draw out a view along these lines elsewhere (forth-
coming) about specifically metaphysical claims of necessity.
The first challenge is to say more precisely what the relation is be-
tween reputedly necessary claims and rules. Logical propositions such
as ‘p or ~p’ and analytic propositions such as ‘Bachelors are unmar-
ried men’ are clearly not themselves rules or statements of rules of use
for the constitutive expressions or logical particles—such statements of
rules would have to be put in the metalanguage, e.g. as “if you deny
‘p’, accept ‘~p”’ or “Apply ‘bachelor’ where and only where you would
apply ‘unmarried man”’. By contrast, characteristic logical and analytic
statements are in the object language. Wittgenstein speaks of logical
and analytic propositions as ‘reflecting’ grammatical rules, and of many
metaphysical statements as ‘disguised’ rules or as ‘hiding’ rules—they
are expressions that have a superficially descriptive form, but really
serve the same function as statements of rules: namely, of conveying
rules.
There are of course various ways one can go in developing a non-
descriptivist view of modal discourse, and the details may need to go
somewhat differently for different kinds of modal claims (physical ver-
sus metaphysical versus logical and mathematical).16 But what can we
make of the idea that analytic propositions ‘reflect’ grammatical rules
(rather than stating them or describing them), while metaphysical propo-
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sitions ‘disguise’ rules? On the view I’ve been defending, metaphysical
claims of necessity are ways of remaining in the object language while
conveying constitutive rules for using the terms in question.17 As I’ve
argued elsewhere (forthcoming), in basic claims of metaphysical ne-
cessity, ‘necessarily’ signals (but does not report) that the claim is an
object-language expression of a constitutive rule of use for the terms
employed and condemns uses that contradict it. Claims of possibility
endorse the relevant uses as in accord with the constitutive rules of use
for the terms employed.
To fully develop a view like this, we need to say why we should feel
the need to convey rules in this (potentially misleading) form. As I ar-
gue elsewhere (forthcoming), conveying the constitutive rules for using
our terms in modal indicatives in the object language is advantageous
for three reasons. First, conveying rules while remaining in the object
language is a crucial advantage for most speakers (who have no famil-
iarity with meta-languages). Second, being formulated in the indicative
(rather than imperative) mood enables these claims to be used straight-
forwardly in reasoning. Finally, the modal (as opposed to simple) in-
dicative enables us to express permissions as well as requirements (a
point first made by Ryle (1950/1971, 244)).
A crucial hurdle for nondescriptivists is accounting for the feeling
that is widespread, at least among professional metaphysicians, that
modal claims are true and tell us something about the modal facts and
properties of the world. In his later work, Wittgenstein was happy to
simply deny this—saying, e.g., we ‘make the mistake of saying they are
true’ (1932-35/1979, 140),18 and suggesting that metaphysicians are
simply misled into thinking that there are modal facts and properties.
But as I have argued elsewhere, these moves are optional for the non-
descriptivist. Hacker even interprets Wittgenstein as allowing a sense
in which philosophical claims may be true:
. . . not that they ‘correspond with reality’ or describe how
things, in fact, are; rather, they specify rules for the use
of their constituent expressions, and their ‘truth’ consists
in the fact that they are the rules (just as it is true that
the chess king moves one square at a time). . . The ‘neces-
sity’ of the propositions of descriptive metaphysics merely
reflects their role as norms of representation, that is, as
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the rules partly constitutive of the meanings of the relevant
constituent expressions, and also as constituting criteria for
their application or non-application. (Hacker 1996, 178-9)
We can see more clearly how this might go in the context of a
deflationary view of truth: even if we accept a non-descriptivist ap-
proach to modality, it is easy to see how claims of the form ‘Necessarily
P’ may be true in a deflationary sense. For example, we may (with
Blackburn (1993, 55)) take truth to require merely adhering to certain
standards—perhaps the standards of use for ‘necessarily’: if ‘P’ really is
an object-language expression of a constitutive rule for using the rele-
vant terms, then ‘Necessarily P’ is true in the sense of adhering to the
relevant standards, for then ‘necessarily’ does its signaling properly. Or
on a prosentential approach to truth (Grover, Camp & Belnap 1975), to
say that ‘Necessarily P’ is true is simply to assert Necessarily P (not to at-
tribute to that sentence some property grounded in its correspondence
to or being made-true by some features of the world). Here, similarly,
there is no barrier to treating necessary statements as true, even if they
are not taken as describing features of this or another possible world.
Moreover, if we adopt a minimalist approach to ontology, we can
even allow a deflated sense in which there are modal facts and prop-
erties. For we can derive terms for modal facts and properties out of
hypostatizations from these modal truths, e.g. moving from ‘Necessar-
ily all bachelors are male’ to ‘It is a fact that it is necessary that all
bachelors are male’—and these terms are apparently guaranteed to re-
fer given only the (deflated) truth of the original statement. Nonethe-
less, although we may be nondescriptivists and still allow that there is
a sense in which there are modal facts and properties (the only sense in
which we should ever have expected there to be), these of course can-
not be appealed to as truthmakers that ‘explain’ why the modal claims
are true, since talk of them is based just in hypostatizations out of the
modal truths themselves. As I have argued elsewhere (forthcoming),
any such attempted explanation would be a mere dormitive virtue ex-
planation. Thus the minimal form of realism about modal facts and
properties remains clearly distinguished from heavyweight modal re-
alisms.
Finally, adopting a non-descriptivist approach to modality does not
require that we abandon metaphysics, but only that we reinterpret what
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it is that we are (or ought to be) doing when we do metaphysics. On
this view, the modal facts that metaphysics seeks to uncover are hypo-
statizations out of modal truths, which, in turn, are ways of explicitly
conveying the constitutive rules of use for our terms in the object lan-
guage. Speakers master these rules, but may lack explicit grasp of them
and ability to convey them in this way—just as speakers must master
grammatical rules but may not be able to state or teach them. The meta-
physician thus has work to do just as much as the grammarian does, and
her work may (in a similar sense) be informative and interesting. And
since her conclusions are stated in the object-language and may involve
hypostatizations, the conclusions of metaphysics may still be said to be
about the world rather than about language (cf. my forthcoming).
But that is just to sketch a little further one way a nondescriptivist
view of claims of metaphysical modality can be developed, in support
of the idea that such a view can at least be made clear, plausible, and
perhaps more palatable than Wittgenstein himself cared to make it. For
it can be made consistent with the idea that modal claims can be true,
that we can sensibly talk of modal facts and properties, and take meta-
physics to have informative and interesting work to do. The full de-
velopment and defense of such a view, and its generalization to other
forms of modality (logical, mathematical, nomological) must be left for
elsewhere (see my forthcoming for a start). For now, it is time to return
to the historical story.
5. WHY IS NON-DESCRIPTIVISM STILL UNPOPULAR?
I have said a little about why non-descriptivism was abandoned, but
why did the approach remain deeply buried for so long—why was it not
revived? The two most important factors seem to be the rise of Quine
and Kripke. Quine’s criticisms of analyticity, which were widely taken
on board, made it seem unpromising to try to understand modality in
terms of analyticity; and Kripke’s apparent discoveries of a posteriori ne-
cessities gave new life to the idea that modal facts should be thought of
as discoverable features of the world—not in any way tied to linguistic
rules.
Quine’s criticisms of the very notion of analyticity in “Two Dogmas
of Empiricism” (1951) were directed primarily at Carnap, and (even
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assuming they are successful) would apply directly only to those who
(with the positivists) seek to classify necessary statements as analytic
statements, where the latter are in turn understood as logical truths and
those reducible to logical truths by substituting synonyms for synonyms.
But if instead we work with a broader understanding of necessary truths
as ways of conveying constitutive rules of use for our terms in the ob-
ject language, we avoid at least those particular problems (particularly
given that these constitutive rules may take a wide variety of forms and
needn’t always be rules enabling the substitution of synonyms).
Such a view does, however, still rely on making a distinction be-
tween expressions which are meaning-constituting, or convey the con-
stitutive rules for using the terms, and those that simply employ terms
in accord with those rules (cf. Boghossian 1997, 382-3). In short, what
is needed is not a distinction between sentences that are true no mat-
ter what and those that must be made true by facts of the world, but
rather a distinction in force, between prescriptive (disguised) rules and
descriptive claims. It seems that Quine would have rejected this as well,
since he had doubts that a behavioral criterion could be given to distin-
guish prescriptive acts of rule-constitution (unless they are made quite
explicit in stipulated definitions) from cases of simply following or vi-
olating rules (1935/1976, 106). But would he have been justified in
doing so?19 If his reason for rejecting this distinction is that it is in-
consistent with his behaviorism, those not committed to behaviorism
needn’t follow him there.20 Those who are willing to accept that there
may be differences in force of various utterances, distinguishing utter-
ances used prescriptively (as a way of conveying meaning-constituting
rules) from those used descriptively thus have no reason to reject a non-
descriptivist approach to modality on the basis of Quine’s arguments
against analyticity.21
The second reason given in ‘Two Dogmas’ for rejecting an analytic/syn-
thetic distinction comes from adopting a holistic account of confirma-
tion. But as I (2007, 37) and others (e.g. Glock 1996) have argued
elsewhere, Quine’s holism also gives us no reason to deny a distinction
between utterances which have the prescriptive force of conveying (in
the object language) rules of use for our terms, and those which have
a descriptive force. We may still accept that, as science develops, any
statement of a theory is revisable—even those that are implicitly pre-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Non-descriptivism About Modality 20
scriptive ways of conveying rules in the object language. The point is
only that some revisions involve not denying the descriptive truth of a
claim, but rather choosing to revise the ‘rules’ of the language we use
to make the claims (just as we may choose to revise the rules of NCAA
basketball to make the games more efficient, less dangerous to players,
etc.).
In any case, Quine’s influence seems to be an important part of
the historical story of why non-descriptivist approaches to modality re-
mained off the table. And around the time of Quine’s “Two Dogmas”
came his rise to prominence, especially in American philosophy, and
with it interest in his scientistic approach, conceiving of philosophy as
no different in kind than natural science. This involved obliterating the
distinctions in uses of language, assimilating them all to a single, sci-
entific use, and led to abandoning the ordinary language approach to
philosophy generally—and with it the methodology of trying to dissolve
problems like that of modal discourse by seeking to understand the role
of that discourse.
Another important factor in accounting for why non-descriptivist
views of modality remain off the table and tend to be met with sus-
picion is the rise of Kripke. Although Kripke’s (1980) arguments ap-
peared after non-descriptivist approaches to modality had already faded
from philosophical consciousness, his ‘discovery’ of a posteriori neces-
sary truths seemed to put the last nail in the coffin of the idea that
necessary truths may be identified with truths that are analytic, and to
give reason for thinking that we should accept genuine de re modal facts
in the world, not tied to our ways of thinking or talking about things.
Indeed his work was taken to suggest that modal features must be real,
discoverable parts of the world, which seemed to rule out the idea that
apparently necessary truths could be known merely by reflection on the
rules governing our use of terms. But as I have argued elsewhere (2007,
62-63; following some ideas developed by Sidelle (1989) and Mackie
(1974)), the discovery of a posteriori necessities does not undermine the
idea that the most basic necessary truths are ways of conveying consti-
tutive rules of use for our terms in the object language, while derivative
(a posteriori) necessary truths are derivable by combining basic ‘frame-
work’ modal truths (e.g. that whatever the chemical composition of this
stuff is, water necessarily has that chemical composition) with straight-
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forward empirical truths (e.g. that this stuff has chemical composition
H2O).
It now seems we have a reasonably comprehensive understanding
of what happened to modal non-descriptivism: early conventionalist
approaches were dismissed based on widely accepted criticisms, which
were largely based on serious misinterpretations of the view. Later non-
descriptivist approaches (e.g. by the later Wittgenstein, Ryle and Sell-
ars) were fragmentary and little known, and often dismissed by associ-
ation with further theses from which they are extricable. Later work by
Quine and Kripke further undermined the idea that necessity could be
understood in terms of analyticity, and Kripke’s a posteriori necessities
provoked a renaissance of the idea that modal features are discover-
able features of the world. These, combined with the ascendancy of a
truth-maker approach to metaphysics (particularly owing to David Arm-
strong, following C. B. Martin), have kept non-descriptivist approaches
to modality largely off the table, and have contributed to the popularity
of modalist and Lewisian possible worlds approaches to modality even
among those who have qualms about what these properties or worlds
could be, how they could fit into the natural world, and how we could
come to know about them.
6. CAN WE GO HOME AGAIN?
I’ve tried above to outline the main historical story of why non-descript-
ivist views of modality arose and why they fell out of favor. But look-
ing back at the story seems to give us grounds for thinking that non-
descriptivist views were often prematurely, mistakenly, or unnecessarily
abandoned. A non-descriptivist view has to be stated very carefully to
be plausible and to avoid the problems of certain forms of convention-
alism. Further challenges also face the non-descriptivist, including con-
fronting the Frege/Geach problem (and showing how, although they
are not descriptive claims, modal claims may be meaningful even in
force-stripping contexts, and may be used in reasoning), showing how
to account for de re modalities, and confronting accusations (e.g. by Rea
(2002), Elder (2004)) that this view leads to objectual anti-realism.22
But non-descriptivism also has crucial advantages over heavyweight
realist and Lewisian views, including a more minimal ontology (that
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treats modal facts and properties as, at most, hypostatizations out of
modal truths—not as truthmakers that explain why our modal claims
are true), and a plausible epistemology, which treats knowledge of basic
modal truths as derivable in virtue of coming to explicit knowledge of
the constitutive semantic rules for using our terms (knowledge we all
have implicitly in our ability to use the terms properly).
At any rate, here I am not trying to suggest that a non-descriptivist
view is completely without problems or challenges to confront—but
then again, neither are its competitors. Indeed, the mainstream views of
modality on the table, from Lewisian extensional possible-worlds real-
ism to heavyweight realisms that posit modal properties, fit so ill with a
naturalistic ontology, and leave modal epistemology at bottom so mys-
terious, that we really might have better hope of working the kinks
out in a non-descriptivist view than of fitting the former views into our
overall philosophical program. It is, at any rate, a road worth traversing
again in hopes of finding something that may have been overlooked.
Notes
1 Of course a variety of ‘ersatz’ approaches to possible worlds have also been devel-
oped, treating possible worlds as (or as replaceable by) abstract representations such as
maximally consistent sets of sentences. I will leave those options to one side here. For
detailed arguments against them see Lewis (1986, Chapter 3).
2 Brandom (2008) begins his discussion of modality with a similar puzzle, asking how
philosophical attitudes to modality shifted so that “what seemed most urgently in need of
philosophical explanation and defense [modal notions] suddenly [became] transformed
so as to be [treated as] unproblematically available to explain other puzzling phenomena”
(2008, 93). He attributes the change to the Kant-Sellars thesis that use of straightforward
empirical descriptive vocabulary already presupposes grasp of the kinds of properties and
relations made explicit by modal vocabulary, undermining the Humean/Quinean idea
that we can make full sense of descriptive discourse while having ‘no grip on’ modal
vocabulary (2008, 98). Yet if this were the main cause of the historical change, one
might expect non-descriptivist views of modality (like Brandom’s own, founded on the
Kant-Sellars thesis) to have been given more of a hearing.
3 Schlick, in turn, was developing ideas originating in Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry
and attempting to generalize them to the cases of logic and mathematics. See Baker
(1988, 187ff).
4 Though a few brave souls—including Blackburn (1993) and Brandom (2008)—have
recently made efforts to revive it, as have I (forthcoming). Others (e.g. Hacker (1996),
Baker (1988), and Wright (1980)) have made efforts at gaining a better understanding
of the later Wittgenstein’s position and its plausibility.
5 Psychologism of course is another option open to the empiricist, but that had been
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subjected to devastating criticisms by Frege and Husserl.
6 Schlick didn’t use the term ‘conventionalism’ himself, however.
7 Of course other forms of conventionalism may need to face (again) these lines of
objection. For other replies to the regress problem, see Dummett (1991, 202), Boghossian
(1997, 374) and my (2007, 32-37).
8 Boghossian (1997) attributes the ‘metaphysical’ form of conventionalism—which he
characterizes as the idea that “a statement is analytic provided that, in some appropriate
sense, it owes its truth value completely to its meaning, and not at all to ‘the facts’” (1997,
334)—to the positivists, and calls it a ‘discredited idea’ of ‘dubious explanatory value
and possibly also of dubious coherence’ (1996, 364). He does, however, show greater
sympathy for what he calls the ‘epistemological’ version of the idea of ‘truth by virtue of
meaning’, characterized as the position that a statement is true by virtue of its meaning
“provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth”. He
attributes the latter view to Carnap and the middle Wittgenstein, and defends it against
certain Quinean criticisms.
9 Baker (1988, 223) takes members of the Vienna Circle to have missed this point
themselves. While some, e.g. Waismann, may have made this mistake, Ayer (in promoting
the Circle’s views in Language, Truth and Logic) apparently did not.
10 One other objection raised against conventionalism at the time was the problem of
accounting for analytic truths like ‘nothing can be red and green all over’, since these
aren’t based in substituting synonyms for synonyms to arrive at logical truths (Baker,
230-231). This is a problem Wittgenstein addresses in his later view.
11 Nonetheless, there are many crucial changes and differences, as detailed in Baker
(1988, 116ff). First, Wittgenstein’s later work is anti-metaphysical: he doesn’t see his
results as grounded in the essence of propositions, but rather in the way the term ‘propo-
sition’ is used: p v ~p and ~(p . ~p) are rules, rules which tell us what a proposition is.
If a logic is made up in which the law of the excluded middle does not hold, there is no
reason for calling the substituted expressions propositions (Wittgenstein 1932-35/1979,
140). Second, he abandons the assumption that atomic statements are independent—
they are organized instead into Satzsysteme. Third, he no longer makes a distinction
between the tautologies of logic and analytic claims: any implication between two atomic
propositions is now called a tautology (even, e.g. nothing can be red and green all over)
because it cannot be false (Baker 1988, 136).
12 Compare Ayer’s similar treatment of the apparent metaphysical proposition that a
material thing cannot be in two places at once (1936/1952, 58).
13 Indeed according to Hacker, one of the key factors in this was a review of Wittgen-
stein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, in which Dummett accuses him of an
extreme and untenable form of conventionalism (1996, 255):
Wittgenstein goes in for a full-blooded conventionalism; for him the log-
ical necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of a lin-
guistic convention. That a given statement is necessary consists always in
our having expressly decided to treat that very statement as unassailable
(Dummett 1959, 329).
But, as Hacker (255-64) and Baker (1988, 263) bring out in some detail, this rests on
a serious misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s position. Dummett takes Wittgenstein to
adopt the extreme conventionalist position that we must separately decide to treat each
statement of logic as unassailable since Wittgenstein denies that propositions in logic
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follow from each other. But, as Baker argues, when Wittgenstein makes this denial, the
point is that it is a category mistake to say that propositions of logic ‘follow from’ each
other, as inferences in empirical reasoning might: “‘Radical conventionalism’ mistakes the
observation that it is nonsense to say that an a priori proposition follows from something
in the sense in which an empirical proposition follows from others for the claim that an a
priori proposition is independent (i.e. does not follow) from all other propositions” (Baker
1988, 263). To think (as conventionalists did) that we can verify a logical proposition by
showing that it follows from a more basic one is again to make the mistake of thinking that
the question “What makes a proposition of logic true?” is an appropriate one—whereas
on Wittgenstein’s view this is a nonsensical question that arises from mistakenly treating
a priori sentences on the model of empirical propositions.
14 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics was published in 1956; Cambridge Lec-
tures 1932-35 in 1979; Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1976.
15 As evidence for this, note that each of those papers has only about 17-18 citations in
Google Scholar, whereas, by comparison, Quine’s ‘Truth by Convention’ has 144.
16 According to Baker, Wittgenstein distinguished three kinds of necessary truths: rules
of grammar (arithmetical equations and geometrical propositions—these are rules for
transforming empirical propositions), propositions masking rules of grammar (many meta-
physical propositions), and tautologies reflecting rules of grammar (propositions of logic
and standard analytic truths). (Baker 1988, 258; cf. pp. 238-9).
17 The idea that the rules in question are constitutive rules for the use of the terms also
seems to be implicit in Wittgenstein (given his analogies, e.g., to the rules of chess). As
Baker notes, the rules for correct use of an expression constitute its meaning, they don’t
follow from it (1988, 148).
18 By contrast, the work of the Tractatus allowed that they are true (though they say
nothing). Early conventionalists like Hilbert and Poincare held that it’s nonsensical to
describe geometrical propositions as (strictly speaking) true or false (see Baker 1988,
199). But Wright (1980, 400 n. 1) says that Wittgenstein ‘throughout his life’ denied that
necessary statements are properly regarded as true.
19 Hans-Johann Glock has argued convincingly and in some detail that Quine’s attacks
on the idea of ‘truth by virtue of meaning’ give us no reason to abandon a Wittgensteinian
account of necessity (1996, 204-224).
20 Richard Creath (2004, 49) argues that the bottom line of Quine’s reasons for rejecting
the analytic/synthetic distinction as formulated by the Vienna Circle was its failure to be
based on a behaviorally observable difference—a point Quine himself acknowledges later,
writing “Repudiation of the first dogma, analyticity, is insistence on empirical criteria for
semantic concepts: for synonymy, meaning. . . ” (1991, 272). So it should come as no
surprise that his objections to accepting a distinction between (prescriptive) acts of rule-
constitution and simply following/violating rules come down to the same bedrock.
21 See my (2007, 29-37) for further responses to Quine’s attacks on analyticity.
22 I address each of the latter two worries elsewhere (respectively in: forthcoming; and
2007, Chapter 3).
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